United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit



APPENDIX

76-1432

IN THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT



DOCKET NO. 76-1432


UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE

V.

DAVID R. LEWIS, ET AL DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

APPENDIX TO BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT DAVID WILLIAMS

HOWARD C. ECKENRODE COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 147 Broad Street Milford, Ct. 06460



UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

٧.

CRIMINAL NO. N-76-5

DAVID R. LEWIS, RICHARD WASHINGTON and DAVID WILLIAMS

INDICTMENT

THE GRAND JURY CHARGES:

COUNT ONE

On or about September 20, 1973, at Stamford in the District of Connecticut, DAVID R. LEWIS, RICHARD WASHINGTON and DAVID WILLIAMS, the defendants herein, did by force and violence and by intimidation take from the person and presence of another, money belonging to and in the care, custody, control, management and possession of the West Side Office of the Connecticut National Bank, 414 West Main Street, Stamford, Connecticut, the deposits of which were then insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 2113(a) and Title 18, United States Code, Section 2(a).

COUNT TWO

On or about September 20, 1973, at Stamford in the District of Connecticut, DAVID R. LEWIS, RICHARD WASHINGTON and DAVID WILLIAMS, the defendants herein, did take and carry away, with intent to steal and purloin, money in excess of \$100 belonging to and in the care, custody, control, management and possession of the West Side Office of the Connecticut National Bank, 414 West Main Street, Stamford, Connecticut, the deposits of which were then insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, in violation of Title 18, Unit States Code, Section 2113(b) and Title 18, United States Code, Section 2(a).

CRIMINAL DOCKET & U.S. V. LITTITAME LIACUTNOTON C TELET

COUNT THREE

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On or about September 20, 1973, at Stamford in the District of Connecticut, DAVID R. LEWIS, RICHARD WASHINGTON and DAVID WILLIAMS, the defendants herein, wilfully and unlawfully, did take by force, violence and intimidation, from the persons and presence of Donna Buchetto, Stella Vattaglia, Margaret Perry, Vera Carrieros, Lu Ann Sciglinpalla, John Danelon and Nicholas Galiatsos, money in excess of \$100 belonging to and in the care, custody, control, management and possession of the West Side Office of the Connecticut National Bank at 414 West Main Street, Stamford, Connecticut, the deposits of which were then insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and in committing the aforesaid acts, DAVID R. LEWIS, RICHARD WASHINGTON and DAVID WILLIAMS, did assault Donna Buchetto, Stella Vattaglia, Margaret Perry, Vera Carrieros, Lu Ann Sciglinpalia, John Danelon and Nicholas Galiatsos and put their lives in jeopardy by the use of dangerous weapons, to wit, a pistol and a shotgun, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 2113(d) and Title 18, United States Code, Section 2(a).

COUNT FOOR

On or about September 20, 1973, at Stamford in the District of Connecticut, DAVID R. LEWIS, RICHARD WASHINGTON, and DAVID MILLIAMS, the defendants herein, did wilfully and unlawfully combine, conspire, confederate and agree together with Joseph Daniels, Arthur Hendrix, and Aaron Stewart, named herein as co-conspirators but not as co-defendants, to commit an offense against the United States of America, that is, to take and carry away, with intent to steal, money in excess of \$100 belonging to and in the care, custody, control, management and possession of the West Side Office of the Connecticut National Bank, 414 West Main Street, Stamford, Connecticut, the deposits of which were then insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 2113(b), all in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 371.

OVERT ACTS

The Grand Jury charges that in furtherance of the aforesaid conspiracy and to accomplish the objects thereof, the defendants at the times and places hereinafter set forth did commit the following overt acts:

- On or about September 19, 1973, the defendants met with each other and with Joseph Daniels, Arthur Hendrix, and Aaron Stewart.
- On or about September 20, 1973, the defendants drove to the West Side Office of the Connecticut National Bank at 414 West Main Street, Stamford, Connecticut.

A TRUE BILL

/s/ FOREMAN

/s/ PETER C. DORSEY UNITED STATES ATTORNEY

/s/ WILLIAM F. DOW, III ASSISTANT UNITED STATES ATTORNEY

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1876.	IV. PROCEEDINGS (continued)	(a) 1	(CLUDABLE ((c)
1976	Unlawful Electronic Surveillance, Motion for Disclos of Electronic Surveillance, Motion for Disclosure Regarding Opening of First Class Mail, Motion to Extend the Deadline for Filing Motion, or in the Alternative, to Grant Leave to File Supplementary Motions, Motion for an Order Increasing the Number of Perceptory Challenges Availabel to Defense Counse filed by deft.			
	Deft. Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Impound and Preserve any and All notes, Reports and Memoranda of Fed. al Burcau of Investigation Agenst, Conn. State Pelice Officers and Bridgeport, Police Officers Relevant to the Instant Indictment, filed by deft.		•	
	Court Reporter's Tapes of Proceedings held on reb. 9, 1976 filed. Gale, R. Notice of Readiness, filed by govt.			
5/1/76	CJA Form 20 substituting Leslie Byelas, for Gregory Craig, filed. Nerman, J. copies distributed. Appearance of Leslie Byelas, filed for the doft.			
5/10/76	Motion to Withdraw, filed by attr. Craim.	3.	5/10/76	G
5/14	Motion to Withdraw emporsed: Motion granted. Newman, J. m-5/14/76. copies wiled to Attys Dow and Bowman.	3	5/14/76	_
6/15/76	Motion for Relief, filed by deft. pro se	3	6/15/76	G
6/21/76	Marshal's return showing service, filed: Writ of H. C. ad Prosequendum.			
6/22/76	Motion for Relief endorsed: Motion denied as Moot, in view of transfer to F.C.I. Danbury. Newman, J. m-6/22/76. copies mailed to Deft and counsel of record.	3	6/22/76	G
7/2/76	Court Reporter's Notes of Proceedings (Plea) held on Feb. 9, 1976, filed. Gale, R.			
7/28	Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus Ad Testificandum, filed and entered. Zampano, J. m-7/29/76. Two attest copies handed U. S. Marshal in New Haven.			
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-	2/9	/76	PL	EA! Fi	nancial A	ffidavit, fi	led by de:	ft.					
1			of M.	Mitche	11 Morse	as counsel f	or deft.	Plea	of not	guilty	11		
1			enter	ed to C	ounts 1 th	hru 4. CJA	Form 20 a	ppoin	ting M.	ne			
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1	2/		1)	Deft's N	Motion to	Dismiss, 2)	Deft's Mo	tion	for Pro	ductio	n		
1			of G	rand Jur	ry Testimo	ny, 4) Deft	's Motion	for 1	Producti	ion at			
1			Tria	1 3) Def	ft's Motio	on for Disco	very and I	npsec	the Act	eft's			
1			6) W	on for l	Suppress	f Evidence Evidence De	erived fro	m Unl	lawful F	lect-			
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1896	IV. PROCEEDINGS (continued)	v.		UDABLE	DEL	AY
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	and Preserve any and all Notes, Reports and Memoranda of Federal Bureau of Investigation Agents, State Police Officers and Bridgeport, Plice Officers Relevant to the Instant Indictment, 11) Motion for An Order Increasing the number of Peremptory Challeng Available to the defense Counsel, 12) Motion for Leave to Join, Adopt, Or Consolidate Motions of Co-Defts. Motion to Extend the Deadline for Filing Motions, or In the Alternative, to Grant Leave to File Supplementary Motions, and Motion for a Bill of	25		:		
	Particulars, filed by deft.					
3/4/76	Court Reporter's Sound Recording of Proceedings (Plea) held on Feb. 9, 1976, filed. Gale, R.					
3/26/76	Notice of Readiness, filed by govt.					
5/3/76	Response to Motion for Discovery and Imprection of Deft's Lewis and Stewart, Response to Deft Lewis' Motion for Bill of Particulars, Response to Deft. Stewart's Motion for Bill of Particulars, Response to Motion for Leave to Join, Adopt, or Consolidate Motions of Godefendants Levis and Stewart, Response to Deft. Stewart's Motion for Production at Trial, Response to Notion for Implection of Grate' Juny Testimour by Defts Stewart and Lewis, Response to Motion for Production of Evidence Pavovalle to the Accised by defts Stewart and Lewis, and Response to Motion to Impounds and Preserve any and All notes, Reports and Memoranda of Mederal Eureau of Investigation Access, State Police Officer, and Bridgeport Police Officers Relevant to the Indictment, Siled by Govt. Response to Motions to Evtend Deadline for Filing Motions, or, in the Alternative, to Grant Leave to					
5/6/76	File Supplementary Motion by Deft. Stewar and Lewis, Response to Notion for An Order Increasing the number of peremptory challenges available to Defense Counsel by Defts. Stewart and Lewis, ciled by Covt. Supplemental Response to Notion for An Order In-	3	5/	6/76	G	
	creasing the Number of Pro-emptory challenges avail- able to defense counsel by Defts. Stewart and Lewis, filed by govt.					1
5/12/76 5/14	Application for Notice of Alibi, filed by govt. Marshal's return showing service, filed: Subpoena t Produce.	0				
5/17/76	Ruling on Pre-Trial Motions of Deft.'s Stewart and Lewis, filed andentered. Newman, J. m-5/17/76. copies mailed to all counsel of record.	3	p/1	7/76	G	
5/17	Following endorsement on deft's Motion to Withdraw Appearanc Since this case is on Judge Murphy's Trial Calendar for May 20, 1976, the Motion is denied, without prejudice to renewal before (continued)			0	7	
		terval	Sti	ort Date	Ltr.	1

	ony R JUDGE	TRATE	U. S. vs. W.	ASHINGTON, I	1CHARD	5	76	N-76-	5 4
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	/5/76	Inidictme Warmant may Bench War PLEA: Plea agreement of U	nt returned issue. Zate rant issue of not guilt . S. Atty. the	d and filed mpano, J. mod and handed ty entered to be bond is \$25	at New Have -1/6/76 I to U.S. Ma Counts 1, 2, 3 ,000, with 10%	rshal for	servi		
	agreement of U. S. Atty. the bond is \$25,000, with 10% (\$2,500.00) sure the last the last to New York. Newman, J. m-1/16/76. Appearance of Dennis Curtis and Barry J. Teller entered for defendant 1/16 Appearance bond in the amt. of \$25,000.00 (with 10% surety) executed and filed. Approved Newman, J. m-1/19/76. Limits extended to New York.								
1	1/23	Notice of	Readiness,	filed by g	ovt.				
	2/9 2/13	Warrant of	arrest with	etter re: di n marshal's howing servi	service the	reon.			
	3/4/76			Sound Record , filed. Ga		eedings (P	lea)		08

OPPOSITE THE APPLICABLE DOCKET ENTRIES IN SECTION IV SHOW, IN SECTION V, ANY OCCURRENCE OF EXCLUDABLE

DATE	IV. PROCEEDINGS (continued)	(a)	(b)	(c)	
3/18/76	Notice of Motion, Motion to Dismiss, and Affidavit Richard Washington and Kenneth W. Salaway, filed by deft.				
3/26/76	Notice of Readiness, filed by govt.				
100	Ruling on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, filed and entered. Motion to dismiss is denied, w/o prejudice to renewal at trial. Newman, J. m-4/22/76. copies mailed to counsel	3	₹r/21 /76	9-	
5/19	Notice of Motion, Motion to Withdraw Appearance and Affidavit of Kenneth Salway, filed.		•		
5/20	Attorney's Affirmation filed by Atty. Salaway.				
6/18	Notice of Motion to Withdraw Appearance and Affidavit of Kenneth Salaway and Richard Washington, filed by deft.				
/22/76	Hearing held. Deft. presented before Court to learn the circumstance for his non appearance. Deft. is advised to appear with his Atty on June 28, 1976 to hear Motion to Withdraw. Deft. is released under conditions of previous bond and Bench Warrant is quashed by Court Order. Newman, J. m-6/22/76.				
6/28/76	Hearing held on Motion to Withdraw. Motion to Withdraw is denied. Deft. is to submit financial affidavit. After Court reviews affidavit it will appt. Atty. Salaway. If deft is able he will make payment towards atty. fees. Counsel advises Court it will submit motion to Sever within one week. Deft. orally renews Motion to Dismiss-decied Court instructs the deft of his obligation to appear and assist his atty in preparation of case. Financial Affidavit, filed by deft. Set for jury selection on Aug. 2, 1976 at Hartford. Newman, J. m-6/28/76. Notice of Motion to Withdraw Appearance endorsed Motion denied for reasons stated in men Court. Newman, J. 1-6/28/76. Court Reporter's Notes of Proceedings (Motion) held on June 22, 1976, filed. Russell, R.		•		
7/9	Notice of Motion, Motion for Severance and Affidavit of Attorney Salaway, filed by deft.	3	7/9/76	E	
7/1	CJA Form 20 appointing Kenneth Salaway to represent deft., filed. Newman, J. Copies distributed.				
8/6	Court Reporter's Notes of Proceedings (Motion) held in June 28, 1976, filed. Russell, R.				
8/11	Motion to Sever endorsed: Motion denied w/o prejudi for reasons stated in men Court. Newman, J. m-8/11/ copies mailed to counsel.	6	-	0	9

fense	MAGIST	IGO Assigned Trust IRATE O3 Disp./Sentence	IN	LIAMS, David	defenda	No. 5 *	N-76-5	5
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2/	9/76	PLEA: A	optmt. of C	ounsel, Howard	C. Eckenrode			
				iled by deft. 4. Newman, J.		guilty	11	
. "	' "	CJA For	rm 20 appoi	nting Howard C.		Esq., file	4.	
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	3/22/76	held on Feb.	9, 1976,	filed. Gale, R. ss, filed by go		(p2ca)		
1	5/10/76			to Join, dopt	on Consolida	re Notion	3 5/10/	6E
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DATE	IV. PROCEEDINGS (continued)	(a)	EXCLUDABLE (b)	(c)	
5/13/76	Deft. William's Motion for Leave to Join, Adopt or Consolidate Motions of Co-defendants, endorsed: Motion granted. copies mailed to Attys Dow and Eckenrode.			;	7
5/21/76	Marshal's rourn showing service, filed: Writ of H. C. ad Prosequendum.		::		
6/15/	Motion for Relief, filed by deft. pro se.	3	6/15/76	G	L
5/22/76	Motion for Relief endorsed: Motion deied as moot, in view of transfer to F.C.I., Danbury. Newman, J. m-6/22/76. copies mailed to deft. and to counsel	3	6/22/76	G.	
7/2/76	Court Reporter's Notes of Proceedings (Plea) held on Feb. 9, 1976, filed. Gale, R.				
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976	PROCEEDINGS	v	. EXCLUDAT	BLE I	DEI
/17(cont	d) Judge Murphy in the event new counsel appears and is ready for trial. Newman, J. m-5/18/76. Copies mailed to all cousel and	-			-
	defedant.	-		-	- -
5/20	Application for Notice of Alibi endorsed: Motion off				- -
3/20	w/o prejudice; Rule 12.1 does not require a Court order.		 	-	
	Newman, J. m-5/20/76. copies mailed to all counsel of		l	-	1-
= /20	on TFM's Jury Assignment List: Ready. Mon. May				-1-
5/20	24, 1976, Jury Selection. Trial for June 2, 1976.		,		- -
	Court defers ruling on oral Motion on Use of Prior				+
	Convictions of deft. Court hears counsel in chambers				
	re: ex parte application for subpoena. Murphy, J.				+
					- -
5/21	m-5/21/76. Marshal's return showing service, filed: 4 subpoena				
3/21	to Testify.		·	-	+
5/24	On TFM's Jury List: Jury impanelled. Murphy, J.				-1-
3124	m-5/25/76.				+
5/24	JURY TRIAL COMENCES: Counsel for deft. Washington				1
2124	are not present and local counsel will select jury for				1-
	them. Govt is not going to trial against the deft.				1
	Hendrix Counsel for defts request a hearing date				1
	Hendrix. Counsel for defts request a hearing date on Motion to Dismiss the Indictment for Pre-Indictment		1	-	1
	Delay, denied for reasons stated in open Court. Court			-	1
	Exs. 1 and 2 marked for ID. Court ex. 3 marked for			-	1
	ID and scaled. Motion to increase the nbr. of pre-				1
	emptory challenges-denied. Atty. Morse moves to renew			1	1
	motion to withdraw, motion denied may be renewed when			"	1
	counsel_files an appearance. Court described the				
	case to the jury. Two jurors excused for cause.				1
	Govt allowed six challenges and one for alternate				1
	challenge. Defts allowed 10 challenges and one for				I
	alternate challenge. Twelve jurors and two alternates		l		
	sworn and imparelled. Testimony to begin on June 2,				1
	1976. Jurors remain for further slection in other				
	cases. Murphy, J. m-5/25/76.				1
6/2	JURY TRIAL CONTINUES: 14 jurors present. Govt.				
	informs Court that Jencks Act material re: Hendrix and				1
	Jefferson given to defense counsel. Motion of U. S.	١			1
	Atty. for Dimissal of Indictment re: Hendrix with				1
	Order of Court granting dismissal endorsed thereon,				1
	filed. Motion of U.S. Atty for Dismissal of Indictment			l	
	re: Stewart with Order of Court granting dismissal			l	1
	endorsed thereon, filed. Deft. orally renews Motion to		l	_	1
	Dismiss and Memorandum in Support of Exparte Application	n			1
	for Subpoena and In Support of Motion to Dismiss, filed			l	1
	by deft. Williams. Court Ex. 3501 and 3502, marked for			l	1
	ID. Atty Byelas moves admission of Kenneth Salaway, Esc			l	1
	for the purpose of this casegranted. Govt Exs. 1, 2,				١
	3A, 3B, 4A,B,C,&D, 5A thru 5D and 6A thru 6T, marked			l	
	for ID. Five Govt. witnesses sworn and testified.		l		1
	Govt Exs. 1,2 and 6C made full exhibits, Govt. Ex 7,		l	l	
	filed. Govt. Ex. 8 marked for ID. Court Ex. 3503, marked	1:			1
	for ID. Govt. Ex. 9A & B, 10A & B, marked for ID.				1
,	Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus Ad Testificandum		1	2	1
	filed and Writ issued. Handed to Marshal for service.		over		1
		-			1

DATE 1976	PROCEEDINGS
6/2	Court Ex. 3504, marked for ID. Govt. Exs. 9B and 10B made full exs.
	Govt. Ex. 11, marked for ID. Govt. Ex. 6B,C,K, & H, made full exs.
	Govt. Ex. 11 made full Ex. Deft. Exs. A & B marked for ID. Govt.
	Exs. 5A thru D, made full exs. Govt makes Offer of Proof and reviews
	Stipulation to be read to jury. Deft. Washington moves for Directed
	Verdict, denied. Defts. Williams and Lewis join motion for Judgment
	of Acquittal-denied. Govt. reads Stipulation to the jury re: exhibits.
	Govt. Exs. #3A&B, 4A-4D and Govt Ex 12, filed. Govt. rests 3:24 P.M. One deft. witness sworn and testified. Deft. Ex. C, marked for ID.
	Court adjourned at 3:28 P.M. until 10:00 A.M. of 6/3/76.
6/3	Govt Request for Instructions, filed.
11 11	Deft. Lewis Request to Charge, filed.
6/7	Notice of Readiness, filed by govt (for retrial)
_6/7	Marshal's return showing service: Subpoena to testify (4)
-11-11	Marshal's return showing service: Habeas Corpus
6/7	Marshal's return showing service: Writ of H. C. ad Testificandum
6/3	Marshal's non est return, filed: Subpoena ticket. JURY TRIAL CONTINUES: Twolve jurors and two alternates present.
97.5	Three deft, witnesses sworn and testified. Deft Exs. D & E, filed.
	Govt. Ex. 13, filed. Deft. Ex. F, marked for ID. Deft. Lewis rests.
	Two deft, witnesses sworn and testified, Deft, Washington rests at
	1:05 P.M. Two deft. witnesses sworn and testified. Deft. Washington
	moves for mistrial, denied. Affidavit of David Williams in Support of Ex Parte Application for Issuance of Subpoeanas and Motion to
	Dismiss, filed. Supplement to Affidavit of David Williams, filed.
	Govt. Ex. 15 and 16, marked for ID. Deft. Williams rests at 3:30 P.M. Deft. Lewis's and Govt's Stipulation re: description of Charles
	Spruill read into record, One govt, rebuttal witness sworn and testifi One witness previously sworn recalled as rebuttal witness. Deft.
	makes offer of Proof. Deft. Ex. G. marked for ID. 4:25 P.M. Govt.
	rests in rebuttal. Juror Zemke excused by Court and replaced by alternate. 4:25 P.M. Jury excused until 10:00 A.M. Court adjourned
	at 4:27 P.M. until 10:00 A.M. of 6/4/76. Murphy, J. m-6/8/76.
6/4_	JURY TRIAL CONTINUES: Deft, Washington moves to delay trial un-
<i></i>	Washington moves for mistrial-denied. Deft. Washington moves ot have
	Goyt, produce Mr. Ablerich and report, denied. Deft. Washington rests.
	Deft. Ex. G. made full Ex. Balance of all govt. Exs. 6A thru 6T made
	full exs. All parties rest at 10:15 A.M. 10:17 A.M. Alt. #1 replaces
	excused juror. Summations Govt. 10:18 to 10:42 A.M., Deft. Lewis 10.42
	to 10:52A. M. Deft. Williams 10:52 A. M. to 11:20 A. M. Deft. Washingto
	11:20 A. M. to 11:40 A. M. Govt. rebuttal 11:40 A. M. to 11:55 A. M. Court charges jury 12:23 to 12:55 P.M. Exceptions to charge noted in
	chambers by Deft. Lewis, no other exceptions. Alt. excused. 12:56
	P.M. Jury retires to begin deliberations. Court denies all pending
	motions. Court files letter dated May 20, 1976, from Court appt.
	defense counsel. "Application for Issuance of Subpoenas" with
	Subjusenas attached. Memorandum (re: Application of Court appt. Counsel
	for Issuance of Subpoenas), filed. Application denied w/o prejudice. All full exhibits and Indictment handed to Marshall and delivered to
	the jury. Note from jury read to counsel. Defense counsel and client's
	confer. Court's reply reads to counsel and delivered to jury. Court
	Ex. 4, marked for ID. Court reads note from the jury. Court's
	reply read to counsel and delivered to jury. Court Ex. 5, marked.
	Court reads note from jury that they cannot reach a verdict. Jury

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	V	(r. Docket h	Vo.	Det
DATE 1976	PROCEEDINGS (continued)		EXCLUDABLE		
6/4	returns to Courtroom for further instructions. Court instructs jury to continue deliberation tomorrow. Court Ex. 6, marked. Jury excused at 5:10 P.M. until June 5, 1976 at 10:00 A.M. Court adjourned until 10:00 A.M. of 6/5/76. Murphy, J. m-6/8/76.	(3)		(c)	(0)
6/5/76	JURY TRIAL CONTINUES: Jury of 12 begins deliberati at 10:00 A. M. 10:48 Note from jury. Jury reports to Courtroom at 10:50 A.Mno further instructions. Court reads note from jury at 2:24 P.M. Reply by Goart road to counsel and sent to jury. Court Ex. 7, marked. 3:40 P. M. Jury note read to counsel 3:42 P.M. Jury returns to Courtroom. Note from jury re read stating they cannot reach a verdict. 3:43 P.M. Jury excused by Court. Court declares a mistrial. Same bond to continue for deft. Washington. Court Ex. 8 marked for ID. 3:44				
6/9/76	Court adjourned. Murphy, J. m-6/8/76. Motion for Leave to Obtain Copy of Trial Transcript at Govt. expense, Motion for Evidentiary Hearing on Motion to Dismiss, Motion for PreTrial Conference, filed by deft. Williams				
" "	Motion for PreTrial Conference, and Motion to Dismiss, filed by deft. Lewis	3	6/9/76	G	
6/21/76	Marshal's non est return, filed: Bench Warrant marked "dism."				
6/22/76	Motion for Leave to Obtain Copy of Trial Transcript at Govt. Expense endorsed: Granted, as modified in open Court; Motion for Evidentiary Hearing on Motion to Dismiss endorsed: Denied for reasons stated in open Court. Motion for Pretrial Conference endorsed: Denied w/o prejudice Newman, J. m-6/22/76. copies mailed to counsel of record.				
"";	Motion for Pretrial Conference endorsed: Denied w/o prejudice, Deft. Lewis's Motion to Dismiss endorsed: Denied for reasons stated in open Court. Newman, J. m-6/22/76. copies mailed to counsel.	3	6/22/76	G	13
6/21/76	Hearing held on all motions for retrial: Atty Salaway's motion to Withdraw over to 10:00 A.M. on 6/28/76, in New Haven. Atty. Salaway and deft. not present. Benchwarrant to issue for deft. Washington. Clerk to send a certified letter to Atty. Salaway with instructions that he be			1	4
	present in Court in New Haven, at 10:00 A.M. on June 28, 1976 to present his motion and to show		-over-		
AO 257	Inter	val	Start Date	I tr.	Total

DATE 1976	PROCEEDINGS (continued)		EXCLUDABL	E DEI
6/21	cont'd	(4)	(6)	(c)
	cause why sanctions should not issue for his failure		1	
	to appear today. Deft. Williams Motion for Certain			11
	Transcripts, granted. Court executed CJA 21.			11
	Court approves transfer of Deft. to F.C.I. Danbury.			
	Deft. Williams motion to dismiss, denied. Deft. Lewis' Motion for Approval by Court of two out of			
	state subpoenas to issue at Govt. expense, granted.			11
	Deft. Lewis's motion to dismiss, denied. Retrial			
	set for Aug. 2, 1976. Newman, J. m-6/23/76.			
6/22/76	Certified letter sent to Atty. Salaway. See docket			
	entry on Sheet for deft. Washington re: Bench Warrant			
6/23/76	Court Reporter's Notes of Proceedings (Motion) held			
	on June 21, 1976, filed. Gale, R.			
6/23/76	Court Reporter's Notes of Proceedings (Plea re:			
	Washington), filed. Gale, R.			
6/30/76	Marshal's return showing service, filed: Subpoena			
	to testify (3).			
7/2/76	Court Reporter's Notes of Proceedings (Plea) held			1 1
	on Feb. 9, 1976, filed. Gale, R.			
6/30/76	CJA Form 21 authorizing Eldridge Waith, Investigate	r,		
	filed. Newman, J. copies distributed.			
" "	CJA Form 21 authorizing transcript of trial, filed. Newman, J. copies distributed.			
7/7	Marshal's return showing service, filed: Writ of	- 1		
	H. C. ad Prosequendum.			
7/7	STEWART: Form B mailed to A.O.			
7/12/76	Court Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings			
	(trial) held on June 2, and 3, filed. Beecher, R.			
7/19	Application for Writ of H. C. ad Testificandum,			
	filed by deft. Lewis and allowed. Zampano, J.			
	m-7/20/76. two cert. copies handed to U.S. Marshall	1		
7/02/76	for service.			
7/23/76	Marshal's return showing service, filed: Subpoena			
7/20	to testify (4) Subposed to Produce (1) Request for Instructions, filed by Govt. (Putting Lives in Jeoph			.
7/29	Request for Instructions, (Accomplice Testimony), filed by Gov.	dy		
8/2/76	SECOND TRIAL COMMENCES re;: LEWIS, WASHINGTON &		i	
	WILLIAMS : Notice of Alibi and Questions on Voir	1		
	Dire, filed by deft. Williams. Decision reserved			
	on Deft. Washingtons Motion for Severance.			
	Atty Eckenrode moves that Deft. Williams be admit-			
	ted as co-counsel for purposes of cross examination			
	Court will allow cross exam by deft. tentatively			15
257	for part of cross examination. Atty. Salawy requests that Govt. be instructed to call deft.			10

•	V	Yr.	Docket No	o. Det
	000000000000000000000000000000000000000			
DATE	PROCEEDINGS (continued)	(a)]	CLUDABLE	DELAY
8/2/76	by his name, as well as possible witnesses who may testify. Request denied. Atty. Byelas moves for permission for all defense counsel to interview Aaron Stewart, former deft. Court will give Steart choice of being interviewed or not. Oath on Voir dire adminstered. 53 jurors respond to roll call. 12 juro 2 and 2 alternates sworn and impaniled One govt. witness sworn and testified. Govt. Exs. 1, 2, 3(a) 3(b), 4(a), 5(a-d) 6(a-t) 7 & 7(a) and 11, filed. Court adjourned at 5:15 P.M. Newman, J. m8/5/76.			
8/3/76	SECOND TRIAL CONTINUES: 10:05 A.M. 14 jurors present. Govt. witness previously sworn resumes stand. Gov. Ex. 14, filed. Oral motion of Deft. Williams for mistrial, denied. 7 Govt. witnesses sworn and testified Oral Motion of Deft. Washington and Lewis for Mistrial, denied. Govt. Exs. 9(b) and 10(b), filed. Govt. Ex12, filed. 3:06 P.M. Govt. rests. Motions for Judgment of Acquittal denied. Deft. Washington Motion to Sever orally renewed, denied. Three Deft. Williams witnesses sworn and testified. Deft. Williams sworn and testified. Govt. Ex. 15, filed. 5:20 P.M. Court adjourned. Newman,			
.8/4	J. m-8/5/76. SECOND TRIAL CONTINUES: 10:00 A.M. 14 jurors present. Deft. Williams previously sworn resumes stand. Deft. Exh. H, filed. Oral motion of Deft. Washington to sever, deied. 12:39 P.M. Deft. Williams rests. One Deft. Lewis witness sworn and testified. 12:46 P.M. Deft. Lewis rests. Seven deft. Washington witnesses sworn and testified. Prior appt. of M. Mitchell Morse in this case to represent Aaron L. Stewart cont'd by Court to represent Stewart as witness. Deft. Ex. E, filed. 4:00 P.M. Court adjourned. Newman, J. m-8/6/76.			
8/5	SECOND TRIAL CONTINUES: 10:00 A.M. 14 jurors present. One Deft. witness sworn and testified Deft. Exs. B & C, filed. Deft. Washington rests 10:33 A.M One Govt. rebuttal witness testified. Deft. Ex. I, filed. Govt. rests 11:45 A.M Oral motions for Judgment of Acquittal-denied. Govt. opens 11:35 A.M. to 11:57 A.M. Deft. Williams 11:57 A.M to 12:27 R.M. Deft. Washington 12:39 P.M. to 1:00 P.M. Deft. Lewis 12:27 R.M.			16
0.257	Court charges jury 2:20 P.M. to 3:04 P.M. over			

1976	PROCEEDINGS (continued)	V. EXCLUDABLE	
8/5	Court rules that Count 4 will not go to the jury. Deft. Williams takes exception to charge. 3:09 P.M. Form and Indictment and Exs. given to jury and deliberations commence. Note from jury 5:05 P.M. Note from Jury 5:15 P.M. Court Exs. A & B, marked. 5:40 P.M. Jury excused until 8/6/76 at 10:00 A.M to continue deliberations. 5:45 Court adjourned. Newman, J. m-8/9/76.	Verdict	(c)
8/6	Motion for Issuance of Subpoenas at govt Expense, filed by deft. Washington. and endorsed: Subpoenas approved. Newman, J. m-8/9/76. Two attested copies handed to U.S. Marshal at Hartford.		
8/6	SECOND TRIAL CONTINUES: 10:00 A.M. 12 jurors report to continue their deliberations. 11:55 A.M. note from jury, Court. Ex. C, marked for ID. 12:20 P.M. Jury returns to Courtroom to have portion of Jefferson testimony read. 2:00 P.M. Note from Jury. 2:20 P.M. Jury returns to Courtroom and portions of Washington's testimony read. 2:50 P.M. Jury returns verdicts of guilty on Ct. 1, 2 &3 as to all defts. Jury polled by Court and verdict verified. Motion of Govt. to revoke bond of Deft. Washington-granted. Sentencing set for 9/13/76 at 10:00 A.M. in New Haven. Newman, J. m-8/10/76. * Court Ex. D, marked for ID.		
8/11	CJA Form 20 executed and approved. Newman, J. copies mailed to A.O. for payment. re: Atty. M. Mitchell Morse. Marshal's return showing service, filed: 3 Subpoena tickets and 1 Subpoena to testify.		
8/12	LEWIS: Motion for Judgment of Acquittal and Motion		
8/12	for New Trial, filed by deft. WILLIAMS: Motion for Judgment of Acquittal and Motion for New Trial, filed by deft.		
8/20	Marshal's return showing service, filed: Writ of		
8/20	Disposition scheduled for Sept. 13, 1976 over to 9/17/76 at 10:00 A.M. Newman, J. m-8/20/76.		
8/23	STEWART: Supplemental CJA Form 20 executed and approved. Newman, J. copies mailed to A.O. for		
8/25/76	compayment. CJA Form 21 authorizing transcript of trial, filed		1
9/1	Newman, J. copies distributed; Deft. Lewis. CJA ¡Form 21 authorizing payment of \$300.00 to Eldridge Waith, Investigator, filed Newman, J. copies		7
-257	mailed to A.O. for payment.	val Start Date I	ır. Te

	V	76 N-76-5
DATE 1976	PROCEEDINGS (continued) (Document No.)	V. EXCLUDABLE DELA
9/3	CJA Form 20 authorizing transcript of trial, filed Newman, J. copies distributed re: Deft. Williams.	
9/13	Marshal's return showing service, filed: Writ of H. C. Ad Testificandum.	
9/20	WASHINCTON: CJA Form 21 authorizing transcript of trial, filed. Newman, J. copies distributed. WILLIAMS	
9/17	DISPOSITION: XMSNXTXXXIOXX Impr. 20 yrs. as a general sentence on all three cts. To commence this date, 9/17/76, and to run concurrently with unexpired portions of other federal sentences now being served. Court recommends that the deft. continue to be incarcerated within the Dist. of Connuntil the dispostion of anticipated post sentencing motions by deft. Newman, J. m-9/23/76	
" "	LEWIS: DISPOSITION: Impr. 12 years as a general sentence on all three cts. To commence this date, 9/17/76, and to run concurrently with unexpired por ions of other federal sentences now being served. Court recommends that the deft. continue to be incarcerated within the Dist. of Connuntil the disposition of anticipated post sentencing motions by deft. Newman, J. m-9/23/76	
8/30 9/17	Notice of Appeal, filed by deft. Williams. Notice of Appeal to 2nd Circuti Court of Appeals from a Judgment of Conviction in the District Court of Connecticut, filed by deft. Lewis and	
	endorsed: Leave to appeal in forma pauperis granted Newman, J. m-9/20/76	
9/20 9/21 9/21	LEWIS: Notice of Appeal, filed by deft. WILLIAMS: Notice of Appeal, filed by deft. WILLIAMS: Motion for Reduction of Sentence, filed by deft.	
9/22	WILLIAMS; Judgment and Commitment, filed and entered. Newman, J. m-9/22/76. Two Cert. copies handed to U.S. Marshal for service.	
9/17	WASHINGTON: DISPOSITION: Impr. 10 years as a general sentence on all three cts. The Court recommends that the deft. continue to be incarcerated within the district of Connecticut until the disposition of anticipated post trial motions by deft. Deft's Motion for Bail, pending appeal-denied. Newman, J. m-9/23/76.	
9/22	LEWIS: Judgment and Commitment, filed and entered. Newman, J. m-9/22/76. Two cert. copies handed to U.S. Marthal for service.	- 18

DATE 1976	PROCEEDINGS (continued)	(a) I	(P)		DE (c)
9/22	WASHINGTON: Judgment and Commitment, filed and entire Newman, J. m-9/22/76. Two cert. copies handed to U.S. Marshal for service.	d.			
9/23	WILLIAMS & LEWIS: Certified copies of docket entries and Notices of Appeal, mailed to Clerk, U.S.C.A copies of Notices of Appeal mailed to counsel on 9/22/76.				4
9/21	LEWIS: Motion for Reduction of Sentence, filed by deft.				
9/22	WILLIAMS: Motion For Judgment of Acquittal and for New Trial endorsed: Motion denied. Newman, J. m-9/22/76. copies mailed to counsel of record.				
9/22	LEWIS: Motion for Judgment of Acquittal and Motion for New Trial endorsed: Motion denied. Newman, J. m-9/22/76. copies mailed to counsel of record.				
9/24	Order for Return of Bond, filed and entered. Newman, J. m-9/24/76. Check #429 issued and given to Pearl Holderby, surety on bond.				
9/27 9/27	Notice of Appeal, filed by deft. WASHINGTON Motion for Reduction of Sentence, filed by deft. Washington.				
9/28	WASHINGTON: Certified copy of Notice of Appeal mailed to Clerk, U.S.C.A Copy of notice of Appeal mailed to all counsel of record.				
9/27	Court Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings (DISP) held on 9/17/76, filed. Collard, R.				
10/1	Notice of appeal (2), filed by deft. Washington.				
10/4	WASHINGTON: Notice of Appeal, filled 10/1/76 endorsed: Time to File Notice of Appeal extended until Oct. 1, 1976, F.R.A.P. 4, and leave to appeal in forma pauperis is granted. Newman, J. m-10/4/76.				
10/4.	WASHINGTON: Certified copies of notices of Appeal and docket entries mailed to Clerk, U.S.C.A. together with the Criminal Case Information (FORM A) as to all three defts.				
10/4	Court Reporter's Notes of Proceedings (trial) held on Aug. 2, 3, 4 & 5, 1976, filed. Merchant, R.				
71 11	Court Reporter's Notes of Proceedings (DISP) held on 9/17/76, filed. Merchant, R.				
n e	Court Reporter's Notes of Proceedings (trial) held on 8/6/76, filed. Merchant, R.			1	9

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

INDEX TO RECORD ON APPEAL

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

VS.

First Class Mail

: CRIMINAL NO. N-76-5

ARTHUR T. HENDRIX, DAVID R. LEWIS, AARON LEROY STEWART, RICHARD WASHINGTON and DAVID WILLIAMS

DOCUMENT NO VOLUME I Court Reporter's Transcript of proceedings of June 2, 1976 1 (Transcript page numbers 1 through 168) VOLUME II Court Reporter's Transcript of proceedings of June 3, 1976 (Transcript page numbers 169 through 40 VOLUME III Copy of Docket Entries A Indictment 3 Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus Ad Prosequendum for David R. Lewis-Order thereon Writ of Habeas Corpus with return attached-David R. Lewis 5 Appointment of Federal Public Defendant for David R. Lewis Defendant Lewis' Motion For A Bill of Particulars 7 Defendant Lewis' Motion to Extend the Deadline For Filing Motions. Or In The Alternative, To Grant Leave to File Supplementary Motions Defendant Lewis' Motion For Leave To Join, Adopt, Or Consolidate Motions of Co-Defendants Defendant Lewis' Motion For An Order Increasing the Number of 10 Peremptory Challenges Available to Defense Counsel Defendant Lewis' Motion to Impound and Preserve Any and All Notes 11 Reports and Memoranda of Federal Bureau of Investigation Agents, Connecticut State Police Officers, and Bridgeport Police Officers Relevant to the Intant Indictment

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the attorneys'.

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Thank you.

THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, now you have heard all the evidence in the case and you have heard the arguments of counsel and now it's my task to instruct you as to the rules of law that govern this case and then it will be your task to apply those rules of law to the facts as you find them and in that way reach your verdicts.

It's exclusively the function of the Court to set forth the rules of law, to explain their application on these legal matters. You must take the law as I give it to you,

But when it comes to determining the facts of the ase, then you are the sole judges of the facts.

It's your duty to find those facts, weigh the testimony, draw your own conclusions as to what you believe the facts are.

You may not go outside the evidence. You may not resort to guesswork, conjecture or suspicions.

If, in the course of this charge, I refer to any facts by way of illustration or to indicate a contention of one of the parties, and if I should state the facts differently than you recall them, you rely on your own recollection and judgment. If your recollection is different from what the attorneys may have said in

argument, you rely on your judgment, because you are the sole fact-finders in this case.

Now, the Government is not to be considered in any way in a different light than any other party to a lawsuit and Counsel for the Government is not to be considered in a different light than Counsel for the Defendants.

The fact the Government is a party in this particular lawsuit entitles it to no greater or lesser consideration than that accorded any other party to a lawsuit.

Now in general in doing your task of fact finding, you can consider two types of evidence. One is called direct evidence and generally that means the testimony of an eye-witness. And the other is circumstantial evidence, and that means facts proved from which a jury may infer by a process of reasoning other facts sought to be established as true.

Now sometimes different inferences may be drawn from the same set of facts. Often the Prosecution will ask you to draw one set of inferences and the Defendants will ask you to draw different inferences.

It is for you to decide which common sense inferences you think are reasonable to draw from the

facts that you think are established.

circumstantial evidence may be received and is entitled to such consideration as you think it deserves, depending on the inference you think necessary and reasonable to draw.

No greater degree of certainty is required when the evidence is circumstantial than when it's direct or with either type of evidence there cannot be a conviction unless you are persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the Defendant.

Now in this case, as in every criminal prosecution, each Defendant is presumed to be innocent unless proven and until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. That presumption of innocence was with each Defendant when he was first presented for trial and it continues with him throughout the trial and as far as you are concerned, he is innocent and continues innocent unless and until such time as all the evidence produced in the trial, considered in light of these instructions and deliberated upon by you, satisfies you beyond a reasonable doubt that he is guilty.

Now the burden of proving a Defendant guilty of the crimes with which he is charged rests on the Government. A Defendant does not have to prove his innocence.

This means that before you may find a Defendant guilty of any count, the Government must prove to you beyond a reasonable doubt each and every element necessary to constitute the crime charged. Whether that burden of proof resting on the Government has been sustained depends not on the number of witnesses or the quantity of testimony, but on the nature and the quality of the testimony.

Now, as to that phrase, prove beyond a reasonable doubt, a doubt founded upon reason, it's a doubt as will be entertained by a reasonable person after all the evidence is analyzed; compared and weighed. A reasonable doubt may arise not only from the evidence that has been produced, but also from a lack of evidence.

Since the burden is on the Government to prove a Defendant guilty of every element of each crime charged, a Defendant has the right to rely upon a failure of the Government to establish such proof.

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However, absolute or mathematical certainty is not required, but there must be such certainty as satisfies your reason and judgment, and such that you feel conscientiously bound to act upon.

A reasonable doubt is not a fanciful or capricious doubt, for anything relating to human affairs and depending upon human testimony is open to some possible

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or imaginary doubt.

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A reasonable doubt is such doubt as would cause a prudent person to hesitate before acting in matters of importance to himself or herself. So if the evidence warrants, in your judgment, the conclusion that a Defendant is guilty, so as to exclude every other reasonable conclusion, you should declare him to be guilty.

you have a reconable doubt to the guilt of the Defendant, you then must find him not guilty.

Now, this case involves criminal charges brought by the Government against the three Defendants on trial. The charges are set forth in an indictment which carries the Number N-76-5, and you will have that indictment with you in the jury room to see the exact description of the charges.

Now I'll go over them in just a moment.

Let me first explain the function of an indictment.

An indictment by a Grand Jury is imply the formal method of accusing a Defendant of certain crimes. It defines the crimes charged and defines the manner of their alleged accomplishment. But the indictment is without any bearing or significance in your consideration of this case, and it is to be accorded no weight by you in determining the guilt or innocence

of any Defendant. By their pleas of not guilty, each Defendant has denied each and allegation set forth in the indigement.

Now one other preliminary but very important matter. You are considering here three separatescases, one case against each of the three Defendants on trial. These three cases are tried together before you simply as a matter of convenience. But in your determination of the guilt or innocence of each Defendant, you must give individual consideration to each case against each Defendant.

Your verdict as to any one Defendant must not influence your verdict with respect to any other Defendant. These are three separate cases and you should consider them individually as three separate cases, one case involving each of these three Defendants.

Now each of these three Defendants has been charged in a three-count indictment which alleges three separate violations of Federal law, all relating to the Stamford bank robbery. Let me first summarize those three crimes before going into them in detail so you'll understand-the overall relationship of one charge to another.

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The Defendants are accused in Count One of unlawfully taking by force and violence or by intimidation

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money from a bank; in Count Two of taking from a bank with intent to steal money in excess of a hundred dollars. This count, that's Count Two, does not include the element of force or violence or intimidation, but simply taking money from a bank with intent to steal in excess of a hundred dollars.

Now, Count Three alleges that while taking the money from a bank, the Defendants put in jeopardy the life of another person.

Now since each count of the indictment charges each Defendant with a separate crime, you must consider the essential elements of each count separately and return a verdict as to each count and as to each Defendant so you've got three Defendants and three counts.

You will have a verdict form which will indicate the separate counts with respect to each Defendant.

Now these three crimes concerning the Stamford bank robbery that are charged in this indictment are the only charges with which you should be concerned. There's be mention in the testimony of other crimes and I'll have more to say about that a little later. But I emphasize now that the three crimes alleged in the indictment are the only crimes you are asked to render verdicts on.

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If you think the evidence establishes beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of the Defendant on any

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one of these three crimes, then you should declare him guilty on that count. But if you are not persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant is guilty of the crimes charged in that count, then you must declare him not guilty on that count.

Now before turning to the three counts in detail, let me just mention that later on in the instruction I'll refer to a special rule that applies where more than one person participates in the commission of a crime.

which the action of one person can be attributed to another person. I'll explain that a little later and I will also explain later the test to apply in deciding whether a person may be found guilty as an aider and an abettor.

Now let me turn to the three specific charges. First, with reference to Count One, Federal law makes it a crime to take by force and violence or by intimidation from the person or presence of another money belonging to, in the custody of a bank, the deposits of which are insured by the Federal Depositors Insurance Corporation.

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Statute defining that crime, let me read the count to you. "On or about September 20, 1973, at Stamford in the District of Connecticut, Arthur T. Handrix, David R.

Lewis, Aaron Lee Stewart, Richard Washington and David
Williams, the Defendants herein, did by force and violence
and by intimidation take from the person and presence of
another money belonging to and in the care, custody and
control and management and possession of the West Side
Office of the Connecticut National Bank, 414 West Main
Street, Stamford, Connecticut; the deposits of which were
then insured by the Federal Depositors Insurance Corporation."

Now there are six essential elements of the count, each one of which the Government has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt. First, that a Defendant actually was present at the Connecticut National Bank, west Side Office on September 20, 1973; second, that a Defendant at that bank at that date took money from the person or presence of another; third, that a Defendant at that bank on that date took such money by force or violence or by intimidation; fourth, that such money belonged to or was in the care, custody, control, management or possession of that bank on that day; five, that the deposits of the bank on that day were insured by the Federal Depositors Insurance Corporation.

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sixth, that the Defendants in taking the money from the person or presence of another by force or violence or by intimidation willingly and will special intent -- by force and violence means the use of actual

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THE CHURCH STREET

physical pressure or constraint and it means such a display of physical pressure calculated to inspire fear to the point of imposing the will of the person exerting the force.

It doesn't necessarily mean actual physical contact, although that could be involved, but that is not a requirement.

Any conduct which is intended to cause fear or terror is sufficient to constitute force and violence as used in the statute.

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And the word intimidation has a somewhat similar meaning, simply means to put in fear or to inspire with fear and fear may be inspired without physical violence or without spoken threats. It may be accomplished by a menacing attitude or a display of force. Threats by words or gestures may constitute intimidation if the effect of such words is to put in fear of physical harm the person towards whom they are directed.

Now this fear need not be so great as to result in terror, panic or hysteria. Confrontation with a dangerous weapon as a shotgun will place the person in sufficient fear to constitute intimidation as used in this statute. There need be no direct proof of actual fear, the fear rather may be inferred where there is just cause for it.

It is not necessary that you find the taking of the money was accomplished by both violence and force

and intimidation. The taking of money by either force and violence or intimidation is sufficient to comply with the requirements of the statute.

Now, money is in the care, custody, control or possession of the bank if it's part of the cash with which the bank handles the normal operations such as the money the tellers use to make change, cash checks or pay out of for depositors.

The term "bank" in this section of the law means a bank, the deposits of which are insured by the Federal Depositors Insurance Corporation.

and then as the last element, it is that the act be done willingly and with specific intent. An act is willingly done if it is done voluntarily and purposely with a specific intent to do what the law forbids. Mere laxness, carelessness, even gross negligence is not enough to show willfulness and specific intent means more than a general intent to commit an act. The person must specifically acting knowing he does what the law forbids and purposely intending to violate the law or recklessly disregarding the law.

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So as to that first count, you have those six elements and as I have indicated, you have to determine whether each element has been established beyond a reasonable doubt as to the particular Defendant whose

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case you are considering at the time. All right?

Let me turn now to Count Two. Federal law makes it a crime to take away with intent to steal money exceeding a hundred dollars belonging to and in the custody of a bank, the deposits of which are insured by the Federal Depositors Insurance Corporation.

In Count Two, it charges a violation of that statute by the same Defendants at the same bank on the same day. I won't read the terms, but you will have the indictment to look at. There are five essential elements of the crime charged in Count Two and each of which the Government has to prove beyond a reasonable doubt.

one is that a Defendant actually was present at the Connecticut National Bank, East Side Office, on September 20, 1973; that a Defendant took and carried away from the bank on that day in excess of a hundred dollars; that the money belonged to and was in the care, custody and control, management or possession of the bank on that day; fourth, that the deposits of the bank were insured by the Federal Depositors Insurance Corporation on that day; and five, that the Defendants in taking and carrying away the money in excess of a hundred dollars on that day actually did so willingly and with intent to steal.

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Now as to Count Three, Federal law makes it

a crime while committing an offense charged in Count One to put in jeopardy the life of any person by the use of a dangerous weapon. In Count Three, it charges a violation of that Statute again by the same Defendants at the same bank on the same date.

There are three essential elements of the crime charged in Count Three, each of which the Government has to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. The first element is that the Defendant had committed the offense charged in Count One of the indictment; the second element is that in committing the offense charged in Count One, a Defendant jeopardized the life of a person or persons in the bank by use of a dangerous weapon; and, three, that a Defendant in jeopardizing the life of a person in the bank by use of a dangerous weapon acted willfully with specific intent.

Now, obviously, before you could find a Defendant guilty on Count Three, you would have to find him guilty on Count One, that is, of having taken by force or violence or intimidation from the person of another money belonging to the bank. So if you find a Defendant not guilty on Count One, then you don't consider Count Three at all. But if you find a Defendant guilty in Count One, then you ought to consider whether or not the evidence establishes his guilt beyond a reasonable

doubt on C int Three.

Now let me explain one of the phrases in connection with that count. To put in jeopardy the life of a person by the use of a dangerous weapon means to expose such person to risk of death by the use of a dangerous weapon. Now risk of death is to be determined objectively, not subjectively. In other words, with respect to this element of Count Three, the issue is whether the lives of persons in the bank were, in fact, in danger, not merely whether any of them thought their lives were in danger.

This element differs from the element of intimidation that I mentioned in connection with Count One. To establish that in Count One all that is needed is to be shown the person in the bank feared violence. But to establish for the purposes of Count Three that the life was in jeopardy, the evidence must show beyond a re sonable doubt that the life actually was in danger.

Now you are entitled, but not required to, infer from all the evidence that the lives of persons in the bank actually were in jeopardy. You're entitled to reach that conclusion if you find that the loaded rifle or loaded pistol was being pointed at them. In considering whether the guns alleged to have been used by the robbers were loaded, you are entitled to consider

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all the circumstances alleged to have occurred during the robbery, including weat the robbers are alleged to have said to the people in the bank.

Now let me explain the rule I mentioned earlier that is the situation where a bank robbery is committed by more than one person. As you will recall, there was an element in each of the three crimes that I explained to you that requires a participant in the robbery to do something in Count One, he had to take money by force or violence or intimidation. In Count Two, he had to take money in excess of a hundred dollars. And in Count Three, he had to jeopardize the life of a person in the bank by use of a dangerous weapon.

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Now I instruct you that the Government does not have to prove that each Defendant individually took each of these actions. If you find beyond a reasonable doubt that a Defendant was one of the participants in the Stamford robbery and if you further find beyond a reasonable doubt that the robbers were knowingly and willingly engaging in a joint venture, the object of which was to rob that bank on that day, then you may find the actions of any one of them in the bank attributed to the others and each of them may be found to have done what any one of them has done.

For example, if you find that one of the

robbers jeopardized the life of a person in the bank with a dangerous weapon and you find that the other Defendants were knowingly and willingly participating with that robber in the joint venture to rob the bank, then you're entitled to conclude that the other Defendants jeopardized the life of the person in the bank with a dangerous weapon, whether or not the other Defendants were actually pointing a loaded weapon at that person.

Of course, you still have to be satisfied that all the elements of an offense have been established before you can return a verdict of guilty on that count.

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Now let me explain the similar rule concerning aiding and abetting. Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aid, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission is punishable with prison. In other words, every person who willingly participates in the commission of a crime may be found to be guilty of that offense. And as I will explain, participation is willingly with intent to do something the law forbids. That is, with a bad purpose either to disobey or disregard the law.

In order to aid, abet, commit a crime, it's necessary that the accused willfully associate himself in some way with the criminal venture and willingly participate in it as he would in something he wished to bring about.

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That is, that he willingly seek by some act of his to make the criminal venture successful.

In this case, the Government contends
that Defendant Richard Washington is guilty of the crimes
charged as an aider and an abettor. They contend that
he was the driver of the getaway car. If you are persuaded
beyond a reasonable doubt that from all the evidence in
the case that Washington was the driver of the getaway
car and that he performed that role knowingly and willingly,
you would be entitled to conclude that he was aiding
and abetting the commission of a robbery.

If you find as to any count that a Defendant is guilty as an aider or abettor, your verdict is simply guilty on that count without any separate indication that the person was an aider or abettor.

During the course of the trial, you have heard testimony implicating the Defendants in criminal activities other than the crimes charged in the indictment concerning this Stamford bank robbery. The Government relies on evidence of Julian Jefferson and I suppose, to some extent, the evidence of David Williams on cross-examination to establish that Williams, Lewis and Washington were participants in the August 31, 1973 robbery of the bank on Long Island and I think it would refer to also as Jericho, but I'll refer to it as Long

Island to distinguish it from the Stamford, Connecticut bank.

Now I caution you ladies and gentlemen to be extremely careful in the way you use this evidence if you accept it as true. If you find that one or more of the Defendantswas a participant in the Long Island bank robbery and if you find that that robbery was carried out in a way similar to the Stamford robbery and both were part of a common scheme or that the planning of the Stamford robbery was an outgrowth of the division of money from the Long Island robbery, then you are entitled to consider evidence of a Defendant's participation in the prior robbery as some evidence of that person's being a participant in the Stamford robbery.

But you cannot use the evidence of other crimes such as the Long Island robbery simply to conclude that one or more Defendant is a bad person or that person is of bad character and for that reason, ought to be convicted of the crimes with which he's charged in this case.

You are not asked to judge the character of any Defendant. You are asked to determine whether the evidence persuades you beyond a reasonable doubt of a Defendant's guilt of any or all of the three offenses charged in connection with the Stamford bank robbery.

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Now let me mention the contentions of
Defendants Williams and Washington, that each of them
was at a specific location other than the bank in
Stamford on the morning of September 20, 1973, when the
robbery occurred. The contention of Defendant Williams
is that he was at home in Hollis, Queens, home about
9:00 A.M -- well, excuse me. The claim of the Defendant
Washington is that he was at home in Hollis, Queens, and
observed there by Yvonne Washington at about 9:00 A.M.

The contention of Defendant Williams is that he left his apartment in Queens around 9:00 A.M. in the morning of September 20th and that he went to where Gloria Burnett works to invite her to his mother's birthday party that night and he went to work.

Now, these defenses that the Defendant was at a place other than where the robbery was committed is an entirely legal and proper defense. But I want to make clear that the Defendant does not have to establish his defense beyond a reasonable doubt. The Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that each Defendat was at the bank.

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So if after weighing the evidence the jury has a reasonable doubt whether the prosecution has proven that the Defendant whose case you are considering was present at the time and the place that the alleged crime

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was committed, then you must acquit that Defendant.

Now, obviously, in performing your function of determining the facts one of the most important things you have to do is to determine matters of credibility, that is, the believability of witnesses.

are entitled to have in mind as you do that. You are entitled to consider the appearance of the witness on the witness stand, try to size him up, did he uppear to you to be telling the truth? Did he appear to be honest? Did he appear to be a person who could have made the observation that he tells you he did and is he capable of reporting to you accurately?

You're entitled to consider whether the testimony he's given you is plausible, does it ring true?

Or are there inconsistencies in it? How does it fit in with the other evidence in the case which you do believe a i other facts you find to have existed?

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You are also entitled to consider whether any witness has an interest in the outcome of the case or any bias that may affect his testimony one way or the other.

If you find that any witness has been deliberately falsifying a material point, you are entitled to take that fact into consideration in determining whether

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he's falsified any other points. But simply because a person has reported one fact inaccurately doesn't mean he's wrong on others. The person may be honestly mistaken on one and accurate on the other and a person may falsify on one and be truthful on another. But if you find a witness has lied on a material point, it's only natural that you would be suspicious of his testimony on other points.

even though it is uncontradicted if you feel a justifiable reason for doing so. Now, of course, it doesn't follow that just because a witness, whether for the Government or the Defense, has an interest in the outcome of the case or a bias, that his testimony is to be disbelieved. There are many people, no matter what their interest in the outcome of the case, who would not testify falsely. But a jury is entitled to bear in mind who the witness is, would the witness have a bias or an interest in the outcome of the case, has there been any attempt to shade his testimony in accordance with his bias or some way to advance his own interest?

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Whether to the advantage of one or to the damage of another?

In general, in matters of credibility, you ought to apply the same consideration and use the same

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sound judgment that you rely on for questions of truth and veracity that are daily presenting themselves in the important matters in your own lives.

You'll recall there was evidence offered by the Government of what sometimes is referred to as an expert witness, the speech pathologist.

Generally, under the rules of evidence,
a witness can't give an opinion or conclusion, but there
is an exception for what we call the expert witness, a
witness who might, through education and experience, become
expert in some particular art or science or profession.

You're entitled to consider the expert opinion given by such a person and give it the weight you think it deserves.

If you decide the opinion is not based upon sufficient education and training or experience, if you should conclude for the reasons given that the opinions are not sound or if you conclude the opinion is outweighed by other evidence, you are entitled to disregard the opinion entirely. What weight you give it is up to you.

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Now in this case one of the witnesses you heard testify was the Defendant Williams, a Defendant who wished to testify as a competent witness. Defendant Williams' testimony is to be considered the same as other witnesses. Now in this case, the testimony of some of

the witnesses was sought to be impeached or discredited by showing the witness had previously been convicted of a felony, that is, by more than a year in prison.

A prior conviction does not render a witness incompetent to testify, but merely a circumstance which you are entitled to consider in determining the credibility of the witness.

Now where one of the witnesses was sought to be impeached by prior convictions, the jury must take care to consider the prior conviction only as it may affect credibility and must not consider that evidence of a prior conviction as evidence that the accused committed the crime with which he's charged now.

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Now the law does not compel a Defendant to take the stand and testify and no presumption of guilt may be raised and no unfavorable inference of any sort may be drawn from the fact that Defendant Lewis chose not to testify. You must not permit such a fact to weigh in the slightest degree against a Defendant nor should it enter into your discussions or your own deliberations.

A Defendant is not required to establish his innocence. He need not produce any evidence whatever if he does not choose to. As I have mentioned before, it is the burden on the Government to prove a Defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

Now let me add some further considerations for you to bear in mind in considering the credibility of witnesses and I'm referring now to the credibility of witnesses Arthur Hendrix and Julian Jefferson. Now each has admitted his participation in bank robberies. By his own admission, Hendrix is an accomplice of the perpetrators of the crimes charged in this indictment. This is a crime in connection with the Stamford bank robbery.

Jefferson is an accomplice of the perpetrators of the Long Island bank on or about August 31, '73.

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I instruct you that the testimony of an accomplice should also be weighed with caution and great care. Moreover, each of these two witnesses understands that he has received certain personal benefits. Hendrix had the charges concerning the Stamford robbery dismissed. Jefferson has received favorable letters from the Prosecutor for the Parole Board.

In such circumstances, you should bear in mind that there is always a risk that an accomplice may fabricate or embellish a story in a way that he thinks will be helpful to the Prosecution. He may not do it deliberately or intentionally. He may even mistakenly believe that the conviction of one or more of the Defendants will cause him to lose some of the benefits he expects to receive. I urge you to keep this in mind when you are

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considering the credibility of Hendrix or Jefferson. They reinforce what I ' .d you earlier about weighing the testimony of an accomplice with caution and great care.

I'm not suggesting that you are not entitled to accept the testimony of an accomplice, even when he has received or may hope to receive substantial benefits.

is accurate as to most or all occasions or details and may be the only evidence available to establish certain facts. You are entitled to rely on Hendrix's testimony whether or not it is corroborated. You should bear in mind what I have said in deciding how much weight to give his testimony and that of Jefferson and you are free to credit none of it, some of it or all of it.

Now those same cautions apply when you come to consider the testimony of Defendant Williams about the participation of Washington and Lewis in the prior bank robberies, that is, the Long Island robbery.

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williams has acknowledge that he was an accomplice of the perpetrators of that robbery, so his testimony implicating others in that robbery a buld be similarly weighed with caution and great care. I do not suggest, however, that when you consider Williams' testimony in his own behalf denying his involvement in this robbery, the Stamford robbery, that any special rule

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applies. The testimony of a Defendant in his own behalf should be assessed according to the same consideration you allow to any other witness.

Now, obviously, this case, like any criminal case where issues of guilt or guilt and innocence are involved is not easy to decide. The accusation against each of these three Defendants as to their participation in the robbery comes essentially from the witness Arthur Hendrix. I have told you about the caution to be applied in considering in accomplice's testimony, and I've discussed the limited use you are estitled to make of evidence if you accept it of a Defendant's involvement in the previous Long Island robbery.

You are entitled to use all of the evidence in the case in deciding whether or not you are persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that Hendrix was telling the truth as to the involvement of each Defendant in the Stamford robbery, but you cannot convict a Defendant unless you believe beyond a reasonable doubt that Hendrix has truthfully described that Defendant's participation in the Stamford robbery. You cannot convict a Defendant because you don't like him or because of what has occurred in his past.

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The only issues before you are whether the evidence persuades you beyond a reasonable doubt of the

Defendant's guilt of the crimes charged in this indictment.

If you are persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt, you should return a verdict of guilty as to the count on which the evidence does persuade you. If the evidence does not persuade you beyond a reasonable doubt as to those counts, then you must return a verdict of not guilty.

Now when you reach the jury room select one of your number as the foreman or forelady to preside over your deliberations, determine the facts on the basis of the evidence, apply the rules of law as I have explained them to you and then return to the Court and render your verdicts fairly, uprightly and without a scintilla of prejudice.

When you reach a verdict as to any one

Defendant on any one count, that verdict must be unanimous.

It is the duty of each juror to discuss and consider the opinions of each of the other jurors. But in the last analysis, it's your individual duty to make up your own minds and to decide this case upon the basis of your own individual judgment and conscience.

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Now let me excuse the two alternates who have sat patiently with us during the trial. I imagine there is probably something of a frustration being almost at the end and then to be excused at this point. Obviously your presence to this point has given us that guarantee

that we would have twelve available jurors, so you have served a useful purpose by your attendance and your attention. But since we have twelve, I will excuse the two alternates and thank we u for your attendance.

As to the jury of twelve, when you retire to the jury room I'll ask you to go ahead and consider who your foreman or forelady is, but wait before deliberating until the Clerk brings in a copy of the indictment, the verdict form and the exhibits, and at that point, begin your deliberations.

All right. The jury may retire.

(Jury retired at 3:05 P.M.)

THE COURT: Does the Government have any

requests?

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MR. PICKERSTEIN: No. your Honor.

MR. SALAWAY: No requests.

of an accomplice to Williams' testimony recording the

Jericho bank, I think including that prejudices him

asfar as the balance of his testimony goes.

to do that since there is an accusation as to the other

Defendants, and I added, I believe, enough language to

indicate they are considering his testimony on his own

behalf, to be considered like any other witness so I think

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1	that distinction is probably sufficient.
2	MR. BYELAS: On behalf of Defendant Lewis,
3	there is no objection.
4	THE COURT: Have you had a chance to
5	examine exhibits and see that they are in order?
6	MR. PICKERSTEIN: We're doing that.
7	THE COURT: Those are retyped?
8	MR. PICKERSTEIN: I believe the Statute
9	on the front refers to 7/73, beneath the citation 18-371.
10_	I just
11	THE COURT: I didn't give them any Statutes
12	at all, so
10	MR. SALAWAY: No objection.
14	MR. ECKENRODE: Had one which the Judge ruled
15	on and
16	MR. BYELAS: No objection to the charge.
17	(Court recessed at 3:08 P.M.)
18	(Court back in session at 5:03 P.M.)
19	THE COURT: Gentlemen, there is a note
20	from the jury which reads as follows:
21	"Could we see Mr. Williams with a ski
22	mask on with the face mask section not pulled down over
23	the face, i.e., similar to the picture used as Government's
24	Exhibit Number 2, robber on the right?"
25	MR. ECKENRODE: Well, since it's my client,

MARTOSE CONSCIONA

United States District Court

FILED

MICROFILM

FOR THE

DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

Ser 27 9 44 61! '76

... I .. L. T COURT

SEP 2 2 1976

United States of America

NEW HAVEN

V.

DAVID WILLIAMS

NEW HAVER, COMN.

No. N-76-5 Criminal

On this 17th day of September , 1976 came the attorney for the government and the defendant appeared in person and by counsel

IT IS ADJUDGED that the defendant upon his plea of not guilty and the jury having returned a verdict of guilty has been convicted of the offense of violation of Title 18, Sections 2113(a), (b) (d) and 2(a), of the United States Code (bank robbery)

as charged in Counts One, Two and Three

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and the court having asked the defendant whether he has anything to say why judgment should not be pronounced, and no sufficient cause to the contrary being shown or appearing to the Court,

It Is Adjudged that the defendant is guilty as charged and convicted.

IT IS ADJUDGED that the defendant is hereby committed to the custody of the Attorney General or his authorized representative for imprisonment for a period of twenty (20) years, as a general sentence on all three counts. Said sentence is to commence this date, September 17, 1976, and to run concurrently with the unexpired portions of other federal sentences now being served.

9/24/76 CC: Federal Bureau of Investigation

CC: U. S. Marshal CC: U. S. Probation

IT IS ORDERED that the Clerk deliver a certified copy of this judgment and commitment to the United States Marshal or other qualified officer and that the copy serve as the commitment of the defendant.

The Court recommends commitment to "

United States District Judge.

*Insert "by Iname of counsel", counsel" or without counsel; the court advised the defendant of his rights to counsel and asked him whether he desired to have counsel appointed by the court, and the defendant thereupon stated that he waived the right to the assistance of counsel." *Insert (1) "guilty and the court being satisfied there is a factual basis for the plea," (2) "not guilty, and a verdict of guilty," (3) "not guilty, and a finding of guilty," or (4) "nolo contendere," as the case may be *Insert "in count(s) number "if required *Enter (1) sentence or sentences, specifying counts if any; (2) where expectances are to run concurrently or consecutively and, if consecutively, when each term is to begin with a ference to termination of preceding term or to any other outstanding unserved sentence; (3) whether defendant is to be further imprisoned until payment of the fine or fine and costs, or until he is otherwise discharge 4 as provided by law *Finter any order with respect to suspension and probation *For use of Court to recommend a particular institution.

United States District Court

MCROFILM

DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT 137 61 76

Ser 221976 ited States of America NEW HAVEN

U. S. LIE LINIOT COURT HEY HAVEIL COIN.

DAVID R. LEWIS

No. N-76-5 Criminal

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as charged in Counts One, Two and Three

XXXXXXXXXXXXX

and the court having asked the defendant whether he has anything to say why judgment should not be pronounced, and no sufficient cause to the contrary being shown or appearing to the Court,

IT IS ADJUDGED that the defendant is guilty as charged and convicted.

It is Adjudged that the defendant is hereby committed to the custody of the Attorney General or his authorized representative for imprisonment for a period of twelve (12) years, as a general sentence on all three counts. Said sentence is to commence this date, September 17, 1976, and to run concurrently with the unexpired portions of other federal sentences now being served.

9/24/76 CC: Federal Bureau of Investigation

CC: U. S. Marshal CC: U. S. Probation

IT Is Ordered that the Clerk deliver a certified copy of this judgment and commitment to the United States Marshal or other qualified officer and that the copy serve as the commitment of the defendant.

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United States District Judge.

Clerk.

*Insert "by Iname of counsel", counsel" or without counsel; the court advised the defendant of his rights to counsel and asked him whether he desired to have counsel appointed by the court, and the defendant thereupon stated that he waived the right to the assistance of counsel." -Insert (1) "guilty and the court being satisfied there is a factual basis for the plea," (2) "not guilty, and a verdict of guilty," (3) "not guilty, and a finding of guilty," or (4) "nolo contendere," as the case may be. Insert "in count(s) number.

"If required there (1) sentence or sentences, specifying counts if any; (2) whether sentences are to run a contractly or consecutively and, if consecutively, when each term is to begin with reference to termination of these has term or to any other outstanding unserved sentence; (3) whether defendant is to be further may a self-antily payment of the fine or fine and costs, or until he is otherwise discharged as provided by law, a Enter any order with respect to suspension and probation. For use of Court to recommend a particular matter than

United States District Court

FOR THE

DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

SEP 4: 11 37 111 76

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U.S. ICHARDT COURT . LEV. HAVEH. CONH.

"ICROFILM SEP 221976 States of America NEW HAVE WASHINGTON

No. N-76-5 Criminal

17th day of September On this , 1976 came the attorney for the government and the defendant appeared in person and 'by counsel

IT Is ADJUDGED that the defendant upon his plea of " not guilty and the jury having ·turned a verdict of guilty been convicted of the offense o iolation of Title 18, Sections 2113(a), (b), (d) and 2(a), of the United States Code (bank robbery)

as charged in Counts One, Two and Three

xxxxbarged'x

and the court having asked the defendant whether he has anything to say why judgment should not be pronounced, and no sufficient cause to the contrary being shown or appearing to the Court,

It Is Adjudged that the defendant is guilty as charged and convicted.

It Is Adjudged that the defendant is hereby committed to the custody of the Attorney General or his authorized representative for imprisonment for a period of ten (10) years, as a general sentence on all three counts.

Lixlex ARM WARR that o

9/24/76 CC: Federal Bureau of Investigation

CC: U. S. Marshal CC: U. S. Probation

IT Is ORDERED that the Clerk deliver a certified copy of this judgment and commitment to the United States Marshal or other qualified officer and that the copy serve as the commitment of the

United States District Judge.

The Court recommends commitment to

Clerk.

*Insert "by Iname of counsel, counsel" or without counsel; the court advised the defendant of his rights to counsel and asked him whether he desired to have counsel appointed by the court, and the defendant thereupon stated that he waived the right to the assistance of counsel." Insert (1) "gullty and the caut being satisfied there is a factual basis for the plea," (2) "not gullty, and a verdict of guilty," (3) "not gullty, and a finding of gullty," or (4) "nolo contendere," as the case may be, Insert "in count(s) number. "If required Enter (1) sentence or sentences, specifying counts if any; (2) whether sentences are to run concurrently or consecutively and, if consecutively, when each term is to begin with reference to termination of preceding term or to any other outstanding unserved sertence. (3) whether infendant is to be further imprisence until payment of the fine or fine and costs, or until he is otherwise discharged as provided by the Enter any order with respect to suspension, and probation. For use of Court is a majority particular to the

MR. DOW: I believe everyone is here.

After concluding the redirect of Mr. Hendrix, the Government intends to call Julian Jefferson to testify, one, about the conversation at which he was present with Richard Washington, David Lewis and David Williams concerning plans to rob a bank in Stamford, Connecticut, that occurred on August 31, 1973.

He will also be asked to testify in the bank robbery he participated in on that day in which those three individuals participated and one aspect of it is that Richard Washington, T.C., drove the getaway car in that bank robbery, the escape car, I believe, and that in fact, he messed up his assignment, similar to what had occurred in this case.

Perhaps if there's going to be a hassle perhaps it might be best to ascertain the Court's ruling at this time rather than doing it and necessitating the jury's exclusion.

THE COURT: All right. You want to offer that testimony as both planning of this crime and a prior similar act. I take it, to show as a prior similar act to show common scheme or plan or also prove the identity of the Defendants?

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MR. SALAWAY: I would oppose that on the grounds that Richard Washington was tried and found guilty but after the guilty verdict, it was by a jury, we learned that certain material which was rightfully 3,500 material had not been supplied by the Covernment although it was in the possession of the United States Attorney, he stated he did not know he had it. It was very relevant to have the stolen getaway car which was later recovered which was commented on at the time of summation plus other information relating to Williams' testimony as one of the accomplices who testified for the Government.

issue, determined that the evidence was such that a new trial should be ordered and it was newly discovered evidence. After Judge Meer ordered the trial set down for new trial, based upon the fact that it was sufficient to show that a jury may very well have acquitted if they knew that particular information. Mr. Epstein, who was the Assistant United States Attorney in charge of the case, instead of proceeding with the trial, dismissed it, nolle proceed the matter.

I contend, your Honor, if the matter had been

tried, there would have been acquittal based on
the additional information which was very
significant, that this particular case Williams
and Julian Jefferson testified as Government
witnesses and were the only two witnesses that
would say Richard Washington committed the crime.

During that particular trial, David Lewis was to be called as a Defense witness and was to testify that Richard Washington did not conmit the crime. David Lewis was in the bull pen, was being brought up to testify and before he was taken out of the bull pen, unfortunately an accident occurred, his jaw was broken, allegedly by one of the other individuals who testified for the Government.

But there was never any proof of that, so
I'm saying allegedly.

williams — Lewis went to the hospital, was in the hospital about a week and a half to have his jaw wired. He was then called to court to testify with a wired jaw so the Government's case was weak, again just an accomplice's testimony, also one of the perpetrators of the robbery, and the evidence that the United States Attorney did not give me related to the getaway car which, as in this trial, is being testified that Hendrix sid

the getaway car was taken a distance away, they all got out and then got into another car and drove to the place where they distributed the money and what have you?

In the case on August 31st, allegedly they did the same thing, but there was evidence in the case indicating that the getaway car was not left a mile or half a mile from the scene of the bank robbery.

Actually it was between where the money was distributed and there was a report which was not given to me which indicated that the FBI found the vehicle where David Lewis said, found near where the money was split up and yet the Government takes the position that Jefferson and Williams were telling the truth.

Now at the time of this submission Mr. Lastein brought out the fact and, well, said on summation, "What bank robber would be stupid enough to take a stolen getaway car ten miles away? Doesn't it make more sense as Julian Jefferson and Williams testified, dropped it five blocks from the robbery and switched into a clean car?"

And that way there would be no way of connecting where the car was found and where they split up the

money. He knew that information. The car was found in the White Castle. That wasn't told to me.

Por these two reasons Judge Neer ordered a new trial and Epstein decided not to prosecute.

I say this, if that case had gone to trial again the likelihood of Washington winning that was good.

I can't say what the jury would do, but Epstein decided he didn't want to take the chance.

Now, Mr. Dow would like to bring that in after the case is dismissed. I have no power to turn down on a dismissal. I can't say I want to retry it because I want an acquittal. If we go in it is Mr. Dow 's case and we can't use it. the Government dismissed, and now attempting to use that against Richard Washington and I am in the awkward position, I don't see how they should be allowed to use it.

If he was acquitted they couldn't possibly use that as a prior act, yet they are trying to use it when the Government dismissed.

I'm taking the position they cannot use the information because they did nolle pros the case. What would have happened when the trial came is the chips would have fallen --

THE COURT: I don't know any authority that
the Government's decision to dismiss a charge
precludes the use of those acts in another charge
if they are otherwise dismissed.

Do you know of any?

MR. SALAWAY: No. I don't, but I do feel it isn't fair play because the Government could have prosecuted this case.

to think and the Grand Jury has indicted people for two charges, I don't see where the Government is under an obligation to run two trials. If they are entitled to present both actions in one, they may decide it's better to have one trial and one conviction and one instance, that will be enough.

I don't think they are forced to try each episode in a separate trial.

MR. SALAWAY: I feel in this case the reason the Government did not do so is because they couldn't win it. They tried it once and that was it.

Now they are going to use the evidence which probably they would have had an acquittal on.

act is unpersuasive, presumably in this case --

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MR. SALAWAY: Not so. Again we are not trying the other case. We don't have the 3,500 material. We don't have the witnesses from the other case.

I would be trying two bank robberies. It wouldn't be collateral, it would be evidence in chief as another crime and I would be cross-examining Jefferson on collateral issues.

Actually in one respect this is the more appealing case for dismissibility because it is unlike some situations where the prior act confronts you for the first time in the trial.

Here you know a great deal about the allegations of the prior act and you have a transcript of exactly what the witness is going to say. There is no issue of surprise.

MR. SALAWAY: I'm not claiming that --

how to meet that strongest in this case and how far you need to go to meet that is a matter that can be dealt with. I hope we don't have to try the entire case, but I'll certainly give you a good bit of latitude in seeking to discredit this

information.

It seems to me that the evidence is fairly strong evidence to satisfy the prior similar acts doctrine. It's not just another bank robbery which I think is the way it was presented to Judge Murphy, but once the testimony was introduced by rebuttal evidence before Judge Murphy, the evidence shows not just a prior bank robbery, but a remarkably similar one where the same cast of characters appear, at least all these Defendants appear.

MR. SALAWAY: No, they don't.

THE COURT: These Defendants?

MR. SALAWAY: Withdrawn, I apologize, yes.
I'm sorry.

the same ones go into the bank and the same one drives the car and his role in driving the car has a remarkable similarity in that there's missed apparently a / or delayed assignment in properly executing the role of driving the car.

similar act on the issue of the identity, it's very probative. Obviously, there's a counter-vailing consideration as there always is in the prior similar act case, but the identity here I

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think is just too strong to be precluded from jury consideration.

This is not a case of offering evidence in bad character. The similarity here is very probative, but I'll give you a good bit of latitude in pursuing this, but satisfying the standards of prior common acts or similar schemes, the fast that the evidence ties into the planning of this very crime, at least that's the testimony that it was the distribution of the proceedings of that crime, that there was a discussion of this crime and so those lengths supply a basis for using the evidence which is very strong.

MR. SALAWAY: I can understand the lengths of the conversation, but I would oppose going into the other bank robbery and I don't feel it should be allowed. I don't think the probative effect.

I think it is prejudicial.

MR. BYELAS: Judge Murphy had a better chance than you do because the way the trial went, the Government had put on trial starting with bank witnesses and led up to the key Government witness, Hendrix, and we had a full blown offer of proof which was more detailed in the transcript, exactly what was going to be said, and

Judge Murphy ruled, he felt it was prejudicial and threw out anything we had in front of us since that trial on our motions for dismissal, et cetera. You have taken the position if Judge Murphy heard it one time and made a decision, you weren't going to review that and I think he was in the better position to make the decision than you are now.

The Government has a right to try the case where they want to. They have put on Mendrix as the first witness, whereas Judge Murphy heard a lot more evidence prior to that decision and he felt that it was so highly prejudicial he wouldn't let it in in their case in chief.

I have given any indication, nor would any judge trying the case, that the evidentiary from a prior trial is binding in the next trial. I have indicated the motions were ruled on and the facts haven't changed that I would tend to follow those rulings.

They may be the law of the case and in any event it didn't seem appropriate to reconsider.

I don't think evidentiary rulings can possibly be in that category. Furthermore, it

SANDERS. GALE & RUSSELL Certified Stenotype Reporters seems that I have scmething that Judge Murphy didn't have at the time. I have the verbatim testimony of the witness. I don't think he had a voir dire and put the witness on the stand to see what the testimony would be.

MR. BYELAS: No.

extent to which it's wing to be detailed and the extent to which examination and cross-examination runs the risk of broadening out into other areas of either prejudice or waste of time, and I've read that testimony. I read it carefully last night, and I find it very persuasive in satisfying the rule of admissibility.

testimony that the witness gave and I am comewhat impressed, not why I am ruling, the fact is that once Judge Murphy heard the testimony in the first case he saw no reason to take any action to avoid having the jury that was considering Defendant Washington's case have that testimony.

Now, it's true he said to counsel that counsel had rested and that was the reason he wouldn't give the severance.

But it seems to me he obviously had no alterna-

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tive than that. If he thought it was prejudicial he could have granted a mistrial as to Defendant Washington. Once he knew what the evidence was, he didn't grant any relief.

Now I have the benefit of that exact testimony which he didn't have at the time he made the initial ruling.

MR. BYELAS: As far as our clients were concerned, we realized once they took the stand it was going to be admissible, in any event, that was our election.

THE COURT: Frankly, I also think it's really a little more direct to deal with it now, to say to your clients that it stays out so long as they don't take the stand, but they stand the risk once they take the stand.

That may be a proper way to do it, but I think that raises other problems concerning their right to testify, so it seems to me if there is prior planning testimony both decisions ought to be made at the outset.

I think on balance, having the benefit of knowing exactly what the testimony is going to be, it is proper testimony, and I think it ought to be ruled

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on now so that the Defendants know when it comes time to make their decision whether to testify they know exactly what they are going to meet.

MR. DOW: Thank you, your Honor.

(IN THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY.)

THE COURT: Good morning, ladies and gentlensen. The witness will be in in just a moment. MR. DOW: Previously sworn, your Honor.

REDIRECT EXAMINATION OF MR. HENDRIX BY MR. DOW:

- Q Good morning, Mr. Hendrix.
- A Good morning.

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Mr. Handrix, I'm going to ask you to direct your attention again to the day before the bank robbery which was the 20th of September -- excuse me, the day before which would be the 19th of September of 1973. The bank robbery was the 20th of September of 1973.

On the day before the bank robbery, how many meetings did you have?

- A We had two meetings.
- Q Now do you remember where the first meeting was?
- A Francis Lewis and Francis Lewis Boulevard and in from of the candy store.
 - Q Do you know whether or not Aaron was at that

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1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT 3 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 5 Plaintiff, No. N-76-5 CRIM. 7 ARTHUR T. HENDRIX, DAVID R. LEWIS, AARON LEROY STEWART, MEMORANDUM RICHARD WASHINGTON and DAVID WILLIAMS, 9 10 Defendants. 11 12 MURPHY, D.J. 13 Defendants Lewis, Stewart and Williams by their 14 appointed counsel have applied for the issuance of subpoenas 15 16 17 18

pursuant to Rule 17(b) for three U.S. Probation officers of
the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York, a special
agent of the F.B.I. and an Assistant United States Attorney
for the Southern District of New York. The subpoena addressed
to the probation officers requires each officer to bring
with him the presentence investigation report that was made
of the moving defendant in connection with criminal cases
in the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York.

The applications, pursuant to the Rule, were made ex parte at a conference held in chambers, with Mr. Byelas representing defendant Lewis and Mr. Eckenrode representing defendant Williams. We were advised that attorney Morse, who is counsel for Stewart, joined in the applications.

The thrust of the applications is as follows:

Some time in July, 1974, Mr. Dow, an Assistant

United States Attorney for the District of Connecticut,

presented testimony to a grand jury in this District that

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crimes.

resulted in an unreturned indictment accusing these defendants of crimes related to the robbery of the Connecticut National Bank in Stamford, Connecticut, on September 30, 1973. We were further told that Mr. Dow requested the grand jury not to file the indictment. The grand jury having been discharged because its term expired, Mr. Dow subsequently presented testimony to a different grand jury. The new grand jury returned an indictment to this Court on January 5, 1976 accusing the same defendants of the same

We interviewed Mr. Dow in the presence of Mr. Eckenrode and Mr. Byelas, and Mr. Dow avowed that it was true that an indictment was voted at the time alleged and that, as he understood it, the foreman or the secretary to the grand jury put the paper in an envelope, sealed it, and at Mr. Dow's request did not return it to the Court. He also noted that the present indictment was filed on January 5, 1976, and that about two weeks ago the Clerk of this Court sent him, in a sealed envelope, what he believes is the prior "indictment", which he had not opened.*

After Mr. Dow was excused, Mr. Eckenrode argued to the effect that defendants have told their counsel that each was questioned in New York City, both in the Eastern District and in the Southern District, by probation officers not only with reference to the crimes which had been committed

The envelope was opened in open court this morning, May 24, 1976, with all counsel being present. contained a three-page document entitled "Indictment," signed by the foreman and Assistant United States Attorney, and we have compared it with the Indictment filed on January 5, 1976 and they are identical.

in those Districts (bank robberies) but also with regard to the crime alleged in the indictment filed in this District on January 5, 1976. Also that they were questioned by an Assistant United States Attorney in the Southern District of New York - after each pleaded guilty to a crime in that District - concerning the facts of this Connecticut indictment. But no one made any admissions concerning the commission of such crime.

We were not told of any prejudice to any of the defendants as a result of the above related facts, nor anything else that might relate to the due process claim of these defendants.

During the presentation it was admitted that United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1971), precludes any argument relating to a Sixth Amendment defense.

We are satisfied that we have not been furnished with any factual situation which relates even tangentially to a claim of due process violation. Accordingly, we deny the application without prejudice to permit counsel and their clients to furnish sworn proof in support of their claims. Since June 2, 1976 has been fixed as the trial date, we suggest that all counsel act with dispatch.

Thomas F. Murrily
Senior United States District Sudge

Dated: Waterbury, Ct., May 24, 1976.

We are not filing this Memorandum in order to preserve the ex parte status of the application. However, we are mailing copies to each attorney.

Re: U.S. v. Hendrix - No. N-86-5

While discussing an ex parte application for some subpoenas with Mr. Echenrode and Mr. Vayles, I interviewed in their presence Mr. Dow concerning allegations of an indictment in this same matter which was allegedly voted on and returned to the Court in July, 1974. Mr. Dow said that it is true that an indictment was voted on at that time but at his request he asked the jury not to file it, and as he understands the facts, the foreman or the secretary to the grand jury put it in an envelope and sealed it and never returned it to the Court, and that grand jury expired by its own limitations three or four months later. Subsequently the present indictment was filed on January 5, 1976, and about two weeks ago the alleged indictment of July, 1974 was sent to Mr. Dow by Miss Consiglio in a sealed wrapper, and he states that even as of now he has not opened it and presumes, or assumes, that it is the July, 1974 paper that he asked the grand jury not to file.

T. F. M.

Sept of sentencing on Sept of New Hovers Cum N-76-15 USA is Jas Chambelli Crum 1-16-19 48An Celebrase Koccush on Fred M. Lety Frechette Richard Wishington Daniel Williams Crim # - 76-5 am Don't Don't Seshie Byelas Jos Pickerstein Joward Geborrode Journalth Salaway

my tral yo Eckenize Salavay las aluady Atty, Eckenwhe stelesse

Co- Coursel for purpose of cross examination. Court for allow cross examination for part of cross examination. Salaway requests that South of a shing two home possible witness who may testify Begust denied. for all Defense attends to case Stephender Menrica Thering Thering interpreted on the chine of herical deministered call. Pist attached. Excused for Cohen Cohen Cohen Eastwood Colon Eastwood Common Mars Stranger Congression Cohen Congression Cohen Congression Cohen Coh 40 drawn

Ponel of 40 drawn the excused for This Leslie Whitehead fun haguente Fyllo Mysley Jean Myslen Jus Francis Currie Dus Maredith Bloking Siz mure homes replace the apor Challenges Kingle Herbrer Ind Pryce In Jone angu - Varjanun Scott

Los Evelyn States waired Following Jonel drown . Stran Flater 9 mis Christier The Cyroson m abran Jes Horders 10 G. Dordian 6 Jes Rochuck 12 Mins D. De Pints alt # 1 Does Margarel Rondenne Cell # 2 Ohn Rose M. Vyandre Balance of gonel ex and Arthur Hendrix, Growt witness, Sworn & testified God Est. 7- Photo of Bank " 31 - 5k. Mask 4' 3B-" 4A An 40 Thues " 7A - Photo - Back of Bank 1 11 - Unemployment payment record. " 5Ath 50 . Photos of Notimobile - Milie 528-ans

8/2/16 171 1-76-5 (Cont) Gov't Est. 2 . Photo of inside of bank n 6(A) the G(T) Plate of inside of bank Court adjourned at 3:15- P.M.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

Aug. 2, 1976 Cnm. N76-5-U.S. A. v Lewis, etcl.

ORDER FOR CHALLENGES

(In criminal cases involving a felony)

UNITED STATES	DEFENDANT(S)
1. 30 Heubner	1.#55 Sectt
2.11 Brown	2.459 Smith, R.
3.50 · Pryce	4. #53 Sheehan
	5.15 Crowe
4. 66- Vaiculi	6. Hosso Hosso
5.29- Gulky	8. # 57 Sheaff
6. 5- ANSUS	9. #6 Ashe
21- Dumond.	10. #10 Botticello
8 S- Benjamin	12 #35 Janes
O O O	13 # 4 Ames
(M)	15 # 26 Gates
	17 - He frs
	78